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AFTER LEGAL AID IS ABOLISHED
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The theme of this conference, "Access to Justice," involves presup-
positions that should be explored. My device for exploration will be a
radical counter factual assumption: The assumption is that agencies at all
levels of government-federal, state and local-ceased to provide fund-
ing for legal services for the poor. That is, public money is no longer
provided for civil legal aid through the Federal Legal Services Program
nor through such subventions as New York City has provided to the
Legal Aid Society, nor is public money provided for criminal defense
services through public defender offices and publicly-financed appointed
counsel systems. In this nightmarish scenario, legal assistance to the poor
is still provided through private endeavors, including financial support
through private charity and the volunteer efforts of practicing lawyers
and bar associations. The financial situation of legal aid today indeed
could be viewed as closer to nominal and symbolic than to being actual
and substantial. But in my scenario public support has been entirely
terminated.
The purpose of the analysis is to consider seriously the conse-
quences of a policy which some conservatives already affirm, or purport
to affirm-that the Federal Legal Services Program, which presently pro-
vides the lion's share of public funding for legal aid, should be abolished.
Like many other slogans from Left and Right, this proposal may be bet-
ter as a sound bite than as a program of public policy. Instead of a sound
bite, however, we should focus on the importance and political signifi-
cance of public subvention of legal assistance for the poor, and consider
the legal problems that would be presented if public subvention were
terminated. The legal aid situation today can be interpreted as presenting
in developing form what these legal problems would be.
* Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Director, The American Law
Institute.
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EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW
It was not too long ago that the financial situation of legal aid was
the one set forth in my counter factual scenario, that is, nearly nonexis-
tent. I will take the 1950's as the point for comparison. At the beginning
of that period Brown v. Board of Education1 had not been decided. The
decision in Brown abolished legalized segregation in the public schools.
More than that, however, the decision cut the legal ground from under an
entire social and political orientation. The immediate problem of school
segregation addressed in Brown had kept black people in a separate cate-
gory of our collective consciousness. The black population in our society
was considered to be the "lowest of the low," to borrow an unfortunate
phrase used by George Bush in the 1992 election campaign. Brown
declared the entire black population to be equal to the rest of us in legal
contemplation. To raise the legal position of the "lowest of the low" to
that of equality, as was projected in Brown, was necessarily to transform
relationships among all other segments of society as well.
Hence, in my interpretation of our history, the decision in Brown
cast doubt on all other social categorizations implicit in the American
"good old days." The decision put into issue the question whether a
woman's place was indeed in the home; 2 whether the United States Sen-
ate, previously organized on the basis of the "Solid South," would con-
tinue to be a conservative sanctuary; 3 whether the Episcopal Church
would continue as this country's quasi-state church;4 whether degrees
conferred by state universities in such places as Texas and Florida could
have parity with degrees conferred by Harvard, Yale and Princeton.5
More generally, the Brown decision raised the question of whether other
kinds of inequalities assumed to be natural were merely artifacts of our
country's particular history. Salient among these received inequalities
was de facto inequality before the law.
Of course, we proclaimed then, as we proclaim now, the principle of
equality before the law. Words to that effect are inscribed on the mantel
of the Supreme Court and are part of the legal catechism of every judge
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1994) (holding that gender
discrimination in jury selection is unconstitutional); United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996) (holding that the Virginia Military Institute could not discriminate against women in
admissions).
3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) (one man, one vote); Reynolds v. Syms, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (same); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (same).
4. The election of John F. Kennedy can be interpreted as marking that transition
5. SHtELDoai GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JuDoEs 347 (1997) (noting a general decline in
federal district court appointees who have graduated from Ivy League law schools).
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and barrister. Indeed, equality is inherent in the concept of law itself.
Law consists of generalizations, as for example, the criminal prohibitions
against murder, assault and theft, and the civil rules of tort liability. It is
the essence of a generalization that it governs all-not some, but all-
concrete instances that come within its terms. Thus, conduct legally
defined as "assault" is assault no matter by whom committed. The same
principle of equality is inherent in procedural law. When the law states
that "no person" shall be compelled to incriminate himself, it means no
person. Hence, when we say that everyone is equal before the law, we
must mean that everyone is, so far as practicable, entitled in legal process
to essentially equal treatment. Or we are simply mouthing comforting
phrases. Or simply being hypocrites. Or some combination of all of the
above.
Notwithstanding the universal embrace of the idea of equality
before the law, however, in the days of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisen-
hower-those days to which we are invited to return through nostalgia
music disks-there was no equality before the law. In particular, the poor
enjoyed no such equality.
PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND THE FEDERAL LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM
The 1960's witnessed very substantial expansion of public subven-
tion of representation of criminal defendants and as well subvention of
civil legal aid.6 For those accused of federal crimes, remedial legislation
provided for federal defender offices in United States Districts with rela-
tively high case volumes and for compensated appointed counsel in other
Districts. In the same period at the state level, public defender systems in
many states enjoyed increases in their staffing and support resources;
some states relied chiefly on appointed counsel systems but gave those
systems more support; most jurisdictions adopted public defender offices
for their cities and appointed counsel systems in smaller towns and rural
counties. In New York City, the Legal Aid Society, a private agency in
its management but essentially public in financial support, became the
recipient of larger public subventions.
On the civil side there was a quantum leap in public legal assist-
ance.7 This resulted primarily from the Federal Legal Services Program
created through Lyndon Johnson's Great Society with the political and
6. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the
Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419-29 (1996); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3005 & 3006A (providing for
public defender in criminal cases).
7. See Roger Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES.
L REv. 531, 587-88 (1994).
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moral support of the American Bar Association under leadership of
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (subsequently Justice of the Supreme Court). The
federal program involved subvention through annual grants to local legal
aid agencies, to other legal aid programs sponsored by law schools, and
to still other more or less free-standing agencies (such as California
Rural Legal Assistance). Federal money for civil legal aid was aug-
mented in some localities by municipal or state subvention, and by bar
association grants, law school subsidies, and private charity. An increas-
ing number of lawyers in private practice or employment contributed
services in kind, a contribution not only of substantial material value but,
even more important, of political and moral significance.' Many larger
law firms established "in house" legal aid programs that continue to the
present day.
These public, charitable and professional subventions of legal aid
and public defender systems could be considered the "supply side"
response to the concept of equality before the law.
Over the same period, there were dramatic changes in constitutional
law that transformed the "demand side" for legal aid in criminal and
juvenile delinquency proceedings. These changes took the form of
increasingly exacting requirements of procedural formality and fairness
under the rubric of Due Process. The basic "demand side" change in the
law was the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright9 in 1963, holding that a
criminal accused must be provided with counsel if he could not afford to
retain counsel himself. That covered a large majority of criminal felony
prosecutions. The "demand" was increased in decisions such as those
imposing the exclusionary rules, 10 the requirement of jury trial in cases
where imprisonment was a possibility," and appointment of counsel in
juvenile court." There was a synergistic effect between the rule in
Gideon v. Wainwright and the increasingly strict procedural require-
ments because the procedural requirements imposed under the rubric of
Due Process were simply unworkable without counsel for the defendant.
8. Hon. Joseph W. Bellacosa, Obligatory Pro Bono Public Legal Services: Mandatory or
Voluntary? Distinction with a Difference?, 19 HoFSTRA L. REv. 745, 749 (1991) (noting an increase
in pro bono activities by law firms).
9. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); See also A. LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET
(1964).
10. See Mapp v. Ohio, U.S. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
11. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
12. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967).
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THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
The adversary system is the essential mechanism of American crim-
inal procedure as received through historical tradition. On the prosecu-
tion side, the American system of criminal justice involves professional
lawyers in prosecutorial offices, making presentations before judges
whose essential function is to be a neutral arbiter between contending
partisans. Our system's dependency on the adversary system indeed was
a basis of Justice Black's opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright.3 This
mechanism contrasts with that which has obtained in other countries,
even in England, where court prosecutions ordinarily are conducted by
police officers, and in the civil law countries, where the judiciary shoul-
ders responsibility for fair procedure and just outcome and where the
prosecution is regarded as a judicial office. Correlatively, the provision
of defense counsel for indigents in this country generated wider and
more insistent claims in the name of Due Process. Many if not most of
the Supreme Court's decisions following Gideon v. Wainwright were ini-
tiated by lawyers for indigent criminal defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright
remains good law and remains preemptive on the "demand side" for
legal services to the poor in criminal cases.
The Due Process requirement that an accused must have legal coun-
sel in effect compels the public, through its legislative and fiscal agen-
cies, either to forego criminal prosecutions or to provide counsel for the
indigent criminal defendants. The public choice, of course, has been to
provide counsel, but reluctantly and usually at marginal levels of quan-
tity and sometimes marginal levels of quality. The Supreme Court deci-
sion in Strickland v. Washington" can be interpreted as judicial
acceptance of the ugly disparity between the requirement of adequate
counsel and the level of adequacy that the public is willing to finance.
More fundamentally, in a political system in which the courts declare the
law but the legislatures control the fisc, the decision in Strickland v.
Washington memorializes the real limits of our concept of procedural
Due Process that can be enforced by the judiciary.
CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
It is familiar that there is no comparable "demand side" rule appli-
cable in civil legal aid. In 1971 in Boddie v. Connecticut,5 the Supreme
13. "[Iln our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
14. Strickland v. Washington., 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
15. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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Court flirted with the idea that Due Process in "serious" civil cases
requires assistance of counsel as it does in criminal cases. But in 1981 in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 6 the Court refused further
extension of the law in that direction. A few states, notably New York,
have gone a few steps further.' 7 However, no politically sober judge,
however anguished by injustice unfolding before her eyes, is willing to
hold that civil justice requires appointment of counsel for any party
unable to afford counsel.1 8 Nor would any politically sober judge hold
that having office legal counsel in nonlitigation matters is a "fundamental
right," as some state courts have held with regard to adequately funded
public education."9 There is manifest conflict between the understanda-
ble judicial attitude that legal aid is not a "right" and the proposition that
we have equality before the law. The contradiction is simply one of
many that must be endured by sensitive realists in contemporary society.
FINANCIAL COST POLITICAL IMPACT OF CIVIL AID
The reason why sensitive realists must endure this contradiction is
at the same time simple and profoundly complex. The simple point is
that legal aid is expensive. Shortly after the launch of the Federal Legal
Services Program, I did a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the cost of an
"adequate" civil legal aid system. My guess was $300-400 million in
1967 dollars. That would be $4-5 billion in 1997 dollars. It is wildly
implausible that Congress or state and local legislative bodies would be
willing today to provide that level of funding for civil legal aid, on top of
the funding for criminal defender and juvenile court representation.2° In
this regard, those of us in the "chattering classes" have to recognize that
the "silent majority" has a very different view than we do of law and
assistance of legal counsel. The majority considers that law is something
to be obeyed and that engaging a lawyer is ordinarily a signal that some-
thing illegal has occurred. The great divide in public opinion in this
16. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
17. See, e.g., Amendola v. Jackson, 346 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding
that there is a constitutional right to counsel in proceeding regarding alleged violation of child
support orders).
18. Cf Judge Robert Sweet, Civil Gideon and Justice in the Trial Court (the Rabbi's Beard),
52 THE REcORD OF THE Ass'N OF Ta BAR OF ma Crrv OF N.Y. 915 (1997) (stating that we need
"an expanded constitutional right to counsel in civil matters.")
19. See Horton v. Meskell, 172 Conn. 615, 646 (1977) (holding that the right to education is a
fundamental right); Abbot v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 282 (1985) (same).
20. M.A. Stapleton, LSC Funds Stable, Reporting Mandate Added, CHICAGO DAILY LAW
BuLir, November 14, 1997 (noting that Congress recently approved a $283 million budget for
the Legal Services Corporation, which is the same as last year and much less than previous
appropriations).
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respect appears to be along class lines except for most members of racial
minorities, who have a different view of the law itself. The financial
requirements of "adequate" legal aid, therefore, is a subject not easily
discussed in frank and open discussion. As long as the silent majority
keeps coming to the voting booths, the political viability of substantial
legal aid, although not its legal respectability, remains in shadow.
The more complex point is that, in the American political system,
public subvention of legal assistance changes the political system itself.21
This is obviously true, for example, when legal aid lawyers bring class
suits challenging the acts of government, a subject that has attracted neg-
ative attention in Congress. The same holds for all kinds of "test" cases
maintained on behalf of the poor-welfare rights, abortion rights, rights
to equal school funding, etc. The political point can be simple stated: If
an act of the legislature or the executive is not challenged in the courts,
then the practical outcome is as the legislature or executive has
ordained-subject of course to reconsideration through the political pro-
cess. Judicial review through legal aid can nullify the choice made in the
nonjudicial political process. If the act of government is successfully
challenged, through litigation, then the practical on-the-ground outcome
is somewhat different, sometimes radically different. Even if a legal
challenge is unsuccessful, the threat of litigation, and the threat of the
cost of litigation, impose significant inhibitions on nonjudicial policy-
makers.
In this view, legal aid, criminal as well as civil, is not merely legal
but also political. It is one thing for participants in political controversy
to use their own money to hire lawyers to carry controversies beyond
lobbying the legislature and the executive and into the courts. It is
another thing for the government itself to finance the hiring of lawyers to
do this. The distinction holds even for causes that seem entirely just in
the eyes of right-thinking people. After all, there would be no substantive
controversy to litigate if everyone shared a single view of what is just.
The political and constitutional problem here is essentially the same, per-
haps in smaller and more diffuse form, as that posed by public financing
of political campaigns.
The conclusion seems unavoidable that, to the extent that legal aid
can have "political" consequences, a contradiction of principle is
involved. The principle of equality before the law requires public support
of advocacy for the interests of the indigent, which in effect amplifies the
21. The classic analysis is, of course, ALEXANDER DE ToCQuEVlLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds. & George Lawrence trans., 1966) (1835).
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electoral power marshaled in the name of the poor. Yet public subvention
of partisan advocacy contradicts a principle of democratic equality.
THE "PROCEDURAL" NATURE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID
This brings me to my principal point. Our system of social ordering
is dependent in extraordinary degree-in my opinion to an unrecognized
degree-on a procedural principle of equal participation in legal dispu-
tation. The key terms here are "equal" and "participation." These terms
are essentially procedural. The concept is that participation will, of its
own force, yield satisfactory dispositions-that is, dispositions whose
content will not require further examination by anyone in a position of
responsibility.22
This procedural concept underlies the Due Process decisions in
criminal and civil cases. The courts say that an accused is entitled to a
lawyer; the courts do not say that an accused is entitled to a fair-minded
prosecutor.23 The courts say that a litigant is entitled to a judge who is
without legally defined bias; the courts do not say that a litigant is enti-
tled to a judge who is demonstrably familiar with the applicable princi-
ples of law.24 They say that a welfare claimant is entitled to some kind of
hearing before being cut from the rolls.25 They do not say that a welfare
claimant is entitled to a bureaucratically regular and technically correct
decision prior to a hearing.
And so on.
The American conception of justice is not simply encapsulated in
the notion of Due Process, but is encapsulated in a notion of Due Pro-
cess defined in terms of adversarial presentation. Indeed, so familiar and
entrenched are these ideas that effort is required to think otherwise. Yet
other possibilities can be imagined.
We should begin by recognizing that most "legal" problems of the
poor arise from the interface with public authority. The interface can be
direct, as in welfare claims or claims of police brutality. The interface
22. In my interpretation, this is the underlying logic of the requirement of "some kind of
hearing" announced in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). See H. Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
23. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1965)'(holding that criminal defendants
have a right to counsel); Cf Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509-510 (1978) (stating that
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from civil suits).
24. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (holding that a judge must recuse himself
when he had recently filed a claim with similar issues to the one in this case); Cf Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448-50 (1965) (holding that defendant's failure to timely object to
introduction of evidence is a waiver of federal right to exclude evidence).
25. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
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with public authority can be indirect, as in grievances that public author-
ity is indifferent to violation of the legal rights of poor people as against
others in private sector relationships. For example, the grievance can be
that public authority is indifferent about tenants' rights against landlords
to have heat in their building or to have their plumbing fixed. It could
also be said, for example, that the public is indifferent to a poor child's
right to go to a decent school.
With regard to these kinds of social problems, other countries have
had a different approach for at least two centuries. European countries
all have systems of administrative law and administrative courts whose
function is not merely judicial review, as in this country, but an adminis-
trative law that is substantive as well as procedural and supervisory
rather than merely reactive.26 A question that arises in this country as a
question of a right to a hearing is, in European countries, addressed as a
question of a right to a correct result, with subordinate issues as to why a
correct result had not been reached in the first instance. The idea is not
"due process" but administrative and legal correctness, for the poor as
well as for the more affluent.27
Something like the same idea also governs the administration of jus-
tice in the courts of the civil law systems. The civil law judge is not
obligated merely to referee a dispute between parties according to rules
of procedural fairness. Nor is the civil law judge concerned only with
procedural fairness. Rather, the civil law judge has an affirmative respon-
sibility, beyond what the parties may submit or argue, to achieve sub-
stantively correct judgments. This is not to suggest that European
administrative justice plays out in accordance with its pretensions. Nor is
it to suggest that civil law judges reach fairer and legally more correct
judgments than their counterparts in this country. Nor is it to deny that
the more affluent citizens in Europe generally get a better deal than the
poor, as they do everywhere else in the world. It is simply to suggest that
the Europeans have an entirely different frame of reference in addressing
"justice."
28
Justice in our implicit conception is an adventitious procedural out-
come. Its basic concept is of the verdict of a jury of ordinary citizens
choosing between contentions advanced through the adversary system
26. See generally JuRGEN ScHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 97-205 (1992).
27. This kind of difference is to be addressed in an international conference, Symposium,
"Abuse of Procedural Rights," Int'l. Ass'n. of Procedural Law, at Tulane Law School, October,
1999.
28. See M. DAMAsKA, THE FACES OF JusTICE AND STATE AuTHmoTY: A CoMARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PRocass (1986).
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under monitoring by an even-handed judge. The conception of "justice"
elsewhere is substantive: "Justice" is a proper outcome achieved by
exercise of professional bureaucratic responsibility on the part of a judge
or administrative official, sometimes aided by party presentations but not
in principle requiring such presentations.
Perhaps a few examples will convey more clearly the distinction I
have in mind between a procedural concept of Due Process and a "sub-
stantive" one in the sense referred to above. Take the situation in Bell v.
Burson, 9 which held that "some kind of hearing" was required as a basis
for canceling a driver's license. While requiring an adversary hearing for
protection of the interests of a licensed driver, the Supreme Court said
nothing about the substantive standards for determining whether a
driver's license may be canceled. Could a driver's license be canceled on
the ground that the licensee had made false statements about his prior
driving record? That he failed to obtain liability insurance, as required by
law? That he failed to respond to reasonable questions when stopped by a
policeman while operating his vehicle? Of course, there are profound
reasons why our courts could not and should not venture into these sub-
stantive precincts. The substantive issues arise from legislation, not deci-
sional law.
But there is a reason perhaps still more fundamental for judicial
abstention. What would be the frame of reference-the point of begin-
ning, the basis of orientation-in which a court would begin analysis of
welfare rights or driver license rights, or welfare rights or public educa-
tion rights for that matter? In a traditional legal frame of reference, both a
welfare claim and a driver's license are "privileges." As such, the state is
free to prescribe the conditions upon which the claim or license is to be
enjoyed and free also to terminate them. Another quite different frame of
reference was articulated some years ago by Charles Reich in an article
called "The New Property."30 Professor Reich would have it that claims
to welfare were a form of property, governed by the full panoply of legal
rights attaching to property-including, presumably, the right to just
compensation if the government were to seek to terminate the payments!
Needless to say, there is a lot of political open water between the concep-
tion of "privilege"and this conception of compensable property right.
Perhaps also needless to say, there is a complex web of policy and tech-
nical considerations involved in devising and administering a system of
drivers licensure, welfare benefits and public education.
29. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
30. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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Another kind of example further illuminates the difficulties in judi-
cial formulation of substantive conceptions of justice. These are cases
where the courts have tried to establish substantive standards under a
constitutional rubric other than Due Process or Equal Protection. The
most conspicuous instance is, of course, "abortion rights," which the
Supreme Court formulated under the rubric of a right to privacy.31 I will
not venture analysis of that intensely controversial issue. I merely
observe that this issue involves supremely intricate congeries of policy,
technical, moral, and religious considerations, which the Court's formu-
lations have not yet integrated into coherent law.32 Another instance is
the Court's endeavor to define a "wall" between Church and State under
the rubric of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.33 Still another
is Buckley v. Valleo, 34 the Court's venture in controls on political contri-
butions, which many observers regard as a legal mishmash and a policy
disaster.35 These examples demonstrate the legal perils to be encountered
in giving substantive content to "equality" in the interest of the poor.
What, exactly, is "decent housing," whether public or private? What is an
"adequate public" school education? What is a "reasonable" provision of
mental health care?
In considering these issues of substantive justice, it will be unavail-
ing to compare what is provided to the poor through public subvention
with what "the rich" can procure with their own money. It is impossible
to provide everyone a home in Scarsdale, an education at Andover, and
medical care at the Mayo Clinics. The real economic and political issue
is one of marginal betterment, where the comparison must be between
categories on either side of a boundary of eligibility. We are now coming
to understand the extraordinary technical and political difficulty in defin-
ing such categories, for example, in health care.
31. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
32. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. West 1991)
(stating that "the formal tests that should be employed by a court that is reviewing the
constitutionality of any type of abortion regulation are not very clear.") Id. at § 14.29 at 771.
33. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (stating that the
Establishment Clause was intended to create a wall of separation between the Church and State). See
also Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1559 (1989) (analyzing the history of religious freedom in the United States and the Establishment
Clause).
34. Buckley v. Valleo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. See Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality and Campaign
Finance, 86 GEo. L.J. 45, 46-48 (1997) (describing Buckley as "one of the most widely scorned
decisions in the recent history of the Court" and outlining the arguments against the decision).
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CONCLUSION
The problem I wish to present, therefore, is this:
If we abolished legal aid, we would also have to abandon our his-
toric premise that "justice" is essentially procedural-the product of
"some kind of hearing" with the assistance of some kind of counsel. We
would then confront a choice between abandoning any pretense to equal
justice, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, adopting substantive
concepts of justice in a wide range of settings where poverty is a salient
factor. I assume that abandoning any pretense to equal justice would be
unacceptable.
The system of legal aid, impoverished as it has become, therefore
may be saving us from, or at least postponing, politically uncomfortable
alternatives. By the same token, however, there is greater urgency to
make serious effort to make procedural justice a reality, that is, to estab-
lish real legal aid for the poor.
